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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade,' minors have been
particularly affected by the efforts of pro-life activists and state leg-
islatures who have curtailed abortion rights by lobbying for and
passing legislation that restricts reproductive freedom. 2 Forty-three
states have enacted laws requiring a minor either to obtain consent
from or to notify one or both parents before undergoing an abor-
tion, 3 and thirty-three of these statutes are currently enforceable. 4
1. 410 U.S. 113, 153, 163-65 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy encompasses a
woman's decision to have an abortion and establishing a trimester framework under which the
state may place no restrictions on abortion during the first trimester, limited restrictions to
protect the woman's health during the second trimester, and a complete prohibition on abortion
post-viability provided that there is an exception for the life and health of the woman).
2. See NAT'L ABORTION & REPROD. RTS. ACTION LEAGUE (NARAL) & NARAL FOUND.,
WHO DECIDES? A STATE-BY-STATE REVIEW OF ABORTION AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 1-14 (11th
ed. 2002) [hereinafter NARAL STATE-BY-STATE] (providing summary of key findings in compre-
hensive review of status of current restrictions on reproductive freedom at the state level), avail-
able at http://www.naral.org/mediaresources/publications.html. While comprehensive and de-
tailed, the NARAL review of state level activity reflects only part of the landscape of restrictions
on reproductive rights. Numerous restrictions have been installed or attempted at the federal
level in a variety of areas, including federal funding of abortions for low-income women, women
in prison, and federal employees, federal funding of both domestic and international family plan-
ning programs, restrictions on the reproductive rights of minors, and restrictions on medical and
surgical abortion techniques. This Note does not encompass the broad range of federal legislative
activity in the reproductive rights arena, and thus it is not discussed in any greater detail.
3. Id. at 11-12; see ALA. CODE § 26-21-3(a) (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.020(1) (Lexis
2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(A) (West Supp. 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-801
(Lexis 2000); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123450(a) (West 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12-37.5-104(1) (West Supp. 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1783(a) (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
390.01115(3)(a) (West Supp. 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-112(a) (2001); IDAHO CODE § 18-
609A(1)(a)(i) (Michie Supp. 2001); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/15 (1999); IND. CODE. ANN. § 16-34-2-
4(a) (Michie 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135L.3(1) (West Supp. 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-
6705(a) (Supp. 2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732(2)(a) (Lexis 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299.35.5(A)(1) (West 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1597-A(2)(A) (West 1992); MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 20-103(a) (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West
1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.903(1) (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(2) (West
1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-53(1) (2001); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.028(1) (2000); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 50-20-204 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-6902(1) (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 442.255(1)
(Lexis 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17A-1.4(a) (West Supp. 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-5-1(C), -5-
3 (Michie 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.7(a) (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1(1)(a)
(1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12(B)(1)(a)(i)-(ii) (West 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-
740 (West Supp. 2002); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206(a) (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-
6 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-31(A)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-
23A-7 (Lexis Supp. 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-303(a) (2001); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
33.002(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304(2) (1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
241(V) (Michie Supp. 2001); W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-3(a) (2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.375(4)(a)(1)
(West 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-118(a) (Lexis 2001).
Seven states (Connecticut, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Wash-
ington) and the District of Columbia currently have no law requiring parental involvement in a
minor's decision to have an abortion. Three states (Delaware, Maryland, and West Virginia) have
parental involvement statutes with special provisions allowing waiver of parental involvement
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The Supreme Court has recognized the right of parents to be in-
volved in a child's upbringing 5 and the prerogative of the state to
limit a minor's freedom to make major life choices due to a minor's
lack of experience or judgment.6 The Court, however, has held that
the Fourteenth Amendment protects minors and adults alike 7 and
that a minor has the right to choose whether or not to terminate
by a physician or health professional. NARAL STATE-BY-STATE, supra note 2, at 12. Maine has
enacted a parental consent statute that permits a minor to terminate her pregnancy without
parental involvement provided a physician has obtained her written informed consent and has
determined that she is mentally and physically competent to offer consent. Id. In addition, Dela-
ware, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, and Wisconsin permit a mi-
nor, under certain circumstances, to involve a nonparent adult figure in her decision to terminate
her pregnancy. Id.
The state parental involvement statutes vary in their counsel provisions for minors in bypass
hearings as to whether the state provides for counsel (meaning an attorney to represent the
minor), provides for an attorney and a guardian ad litem, or provides for a guardian ad litem
only.
While proponents of parental involvement statutes argue that parents should always be ac-
tively involved in their child's decision to have an abortion, there are many minors who are un-
able to confide in their parents for fear that they will be expelled from the home, abused, or will
cause their parents great emotional distress or embarrassment. See Council on Ethical and Judi-
cial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, Mandatory Parental Consent to Abortion, 269 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 82,
83 (1993) (discussing abuse in families that may prevent minor from involving parent in the
decision); Patricia Donovan, Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare When They Seek Court-
Authorized Abortions, 15 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 259, 262 (1983) (citing substance abuse, parental
illness and marital difficulties, parental opposition to abortion, and parental disappointment as
reasons why a minor chooses not to involve her parents); J. Shoshanna Ehrlich & Jamie Ann
Sabino, A Minor's Right to Abortion-The Unconstitutionality of Parental Participation in Bypass
Hearings, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1185, 1201 (1991) (discussing reasons why a minor may choose
not to involve a parent in her decision to have an abortion, including abuse, family stress, or
serious illness); Stanley K. Henshaw & Kathryn Kost, Parental Involvement in Minors'Abortion
Decisions, 24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 196, 207 (1992) (citing reasons, including physical harm or
eviction from the home, why minors choose not to involve parents in the decision).
4. NARAL STATE-BY-STATE, supra note 2, at 12. The parental involvement statutes in ten
states (Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey,
and New Mexico) have been invalidated or enjoined. For a helpful summary of these state chal-
lenges, see generally NARAL STATE-BY-STATE, supra note 2.
5. See infra note 31.
6. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635-39 (1979) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that
the state may permissibly limit the freedom of minors to make significant life decisions on their
own and that parents play a crucial role in the nurturing and upbringing of their children);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("The Court indeed, however, long has
recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children
than of adults.").
7. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633-34 ("A child, merely on account of his minority, is not be-
yond the protection of the Constitution .... With respect to many [claims by minors that they are
constitutionally protected against deprivations of liberty or property], [the Court has] concluded
that the child's right is virtually coextensive with that of an adult."); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74
("Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the
state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and
possess constitutional rights."); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) ("[N]either the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.").
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her pregnancy, subject to certain limitations imposed by the state.8
The Supreme Court has held that if a state requires a minor to con-
sult with a parent before deciding to terminate her pregnancy, the
state must offer the minor a judicial bypass option 9 if she chooses
not to involve a parent. 10 The Court reasoned that, in order to pro-
tect a minor's right to choose, the state cannot allow parents an ab-
solute veto over a minor's decision if she is mature enough to make
the decision on her own or if she can demonstrate to a court that an
abortion would be in her best interests."
While the Supreme Court has not ruled whether a minor has
a right to counsel in civil proceedings,12 child advocates argue that
8. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642-44 (recognizing that the state may not impose a third-party
veto over a minor's decision to obtain an abortion and that a minor has the right to seek a judi-
cial waiver of parental consent in order to make the decision independently); Danforth, 428 U.S.
at 74-75 (recognizing that a pregnant minor's right to privacy is equally important to the interest
of the parent in the minor's decision and that, as such, the parent does not have the right to act
as "an absolute, and possibly arbitrary" third-party veto over the minor's decision to have an
abortion).
9. The "judicial bypass" option permits a minor to bypass the parental involvement re-
quirement generally by appearing before a judge in a court proceeding to explain her situation.
An order from the judge, which either finds that the minor is mature enough to make an
independent decision or that an abortion is in the minor's best interests, allows the minor to
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy without parental involvement. See Donovan, supra
note 3, at 260; Ehrlich & Sabino, supra note 3, at 1193. A court generally determines a minor's
maturity or best interests on the basis of evidence presented by the minor or her legal
representation in the hearing that may attest to a range of factors, including the minor's level of
independence at home, involvement in extracurricular activities, employment (e.g., work after
school, babysitting), consultation with medical personnel or clergy about the emotional and
physical consequences of having an abortion, the risk of abuse or family trauma at home, risk of
eviction from the home, or stress on the minor's financial situation or educational plans. See
Donovan, supra note 3, at 261; see also Ehrlich & Sabino, supra note 3, at 1202 (describing
hearing process with judge).
10. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44 (holding that ifa minor is required to involve a parent in
order to obtain an abortion, then the state "must provide an alternative procedure" by which the
minor can obtain a judicial waiver of parental involvement).
11. Id. at 644 (holding that the judicial bypass procedure "must ensure that the provision
requiring parental consent does not in fact amount to the 'absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto'
that was found impermissible in Danforth").
12. See Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. & Sharon S. England, "I Know the Child Is My Client, But
Who Am I?," 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1917, 1920 (1996); see also Marvin R. Ventrell, Rights & Du-
ties: An Overview of the Attorney-Child Client Relationship, 26 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 259, 267 (1995)
(noting that In re Gault only extended the right to counsel to delinquent minors and that no
"universal declaration of the right to counsel exists in protection proceedings"); Robyn-Marie
Lyon, Comment, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 681, 688 (1987) (noting that support for independent representation for minors varies out-
side of the juvenile delinquency context). Civil proceedings might include child abuse and ne-
glect, termination of parental rights, custody and visitation disputes, adoption, or institutionali-
zation of a minor with mental illness. Shepherd & England, supra, at 1932-33.
In the 1967 decision of In re Gault, the Supreme Court held that, under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a minor is entitled to notice that he has the right to coun-
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the appointment of counsel for minors in civil proceedings is neces-
sary to ensure effective legal representation and adequate protec-
tion of a minor's interests. 13 In states that mandate appointment of
independent counsel on behalf of a minor in a civil proceeding, a
juvenile court may appoint an attorney or a guardian ad litem to
represent the minor. 14 In addition to judicial bypass proceedings, a
guardian ad litem may be appointed to represent a minor in pro-
ceedings involving child abuse and neglect, custody disputes, ter-
mination of parental rights, and adoptions.15 A guardian ad litem is
often a lawyer "appointed by the court to appear in a lawsuit on
behalf of an incompetent or minor party.' 1 6 In circumstances in
which there is no conflict of interest between parent and child, par-
ents may serve as guardians ad litem because they are the natural
guardians of their children.17 A judicial bypass proceeding, however,
is a situation in which the court appoints representation because
there is clearly either a conflict of interest between parent and child
or the minor has chosen not to involve her parents.' 8
An attorney and a guardian ad litem, however, are bound by
very different professional standards defining each one's obligations
towards their clients. The representative serving in the role of an
attorney is generally bound by guidelines of professional responsi-
bility, 19 while a representative serving as a guardian ad litem is not
sel in juvenile delinquency proceedings where the minor's liberty interests are at stake because
the minor faces the possibility of incarceration. 387 U.S. at 41.
13. Tari Eitzen, A Child's Right to Independent Legal Representation in a Custody Dispute,
19 FAM. L.Q. 53, 60-66 (1985) (arguing that a child in a custody dispute is entitled to independ-
ent legal representation to ensure due process for the child and to ensure that his or her inter-
ests are protected); Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing Counsel for Chil-
dren in Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1571, 1595-1614 (1996) (discussing importance of
appointment of independent counsel for minors to protect interests and ensure access to courts);
Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for Children, 27 FAM. L.Q. 349, 350-51 (1993) (discuss-
ing importance of independent advocate for child when interests of child differ from those of
parents).
14. Shepherd & England, supra note 12, at 1933; see also infra note 78 (discussing passage
of federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, which required states to appoint a guard-
ian ad litem for a minor in abuse and neglect cases in exchange for federal aid).
15. 1 DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 12.04, at 536-38 (2d ed. 1994);
Shepherd & England, supra note 12, at 1920-22, 1932-33; Roy T. Stuckey, Guardians ad Litem
as Surrogate Parents. Implications for Role Definition and Confidentiality, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
1785, 1785 n.4 (1996).
16. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 713 (7th ed. 1999). States vary in their requirements as to
who is qualified to serve as a guardian ad litem and in what capacity. See infra notes 78-88 and
accompanying text.
17. 1 KRAMER, supra note 15, § 12.03, at 534; Stuckey, supra note 15, at 1785.
18. 1 KRAMER, supra note 15, § 12.03, at 535; Stuckey, supra note 15, at 1785 & 1785 n.4.
19. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]
(containing rules promulgated by the American Bar Association that define basic professional
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necessarily bound by the same client obligations. 20 In general, a
guardian ad litem is not bound by the client's expressed wishes and
is able to advocate for a result that he or she believes to be in the
minor's best interests. 21 By contrast, an individual serving as an
attorney is obligated under professional and ethical rules to advo-
cate for a minor's expressed preferences, irrespective of what the
attorney believes to be in the minor's best interests. 22 Furthermore,
an attorney is obligated to maintain client confidentiality under
ethical guidelines, 23 while a guardian ad litem generally does not
have any confidentiality obligations towards his or her minor cli-
ent.2
4
Because of the different ethical guidelines that govern attor-
neys and guardians ad litem, the appointment of a guardian ad
litem in a judicial bypass hearing could be problematic for a minor.
If a court appoints a guardian ad litem rather than an attorney, it
is possible that the guardian ad litem will subvert the minor's ex-
pressed interest in seeking a judicial waiver of parental involve-
ment by advocating that the minor should consult her parents or
that an abortion is not in the minor's best interests. The Supreme
Court has recognized the special nature of the abortion decision
relative to other decisions that a minor might face, 25 and has held
that, despite her youth, if a minor chooses not to involve her par-
ents in her decision, she is entitled to the opportunity to show a
duties to which attorneys must adhere when representing clients). Approximately two-thirds of
the states have since adopted the Model Rules with some modifications. Shepherd & England,
supra note 12, at 1935.
20. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
21. See ANN M. HARALAMBIE, THE CHILD'S ATTORNEY 6 (1993) (stating that a guardian ad
litem is permitted to advocate for what he or she perceives to be in the best interests of the minor
and is not bound by the minor's expressed preferences); 1 KRAMER, supra note 15, § 12.05, at 542
(stating that a guardian ad litem is responsible for representing a minor's best interests); Emily
Buss, "You're My What?" The Problem of Children's Misperceptions of Their Lawyers' Roles, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1731-32 (1996) ("[Guardians ad litem] abandon the most fundamental
aspect of the client-lawyer relationship: They strip their clients of any decision-making control
and assume responsibility for ascertaining the child's best interests."); Stuckey, supra note 15, at
1787-88 (stating that the guardian ad litem advocates for what he or she believes to be in the
minor's best interests).
22. See MODEL RULES, supra note 19, R. 1.2, 1.14; see also HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at
12 (stating that the attorney for a minor is expected to maintain his or her traditional role as a
zealous advocate for the minor's interests).
23. MODEL RULES, supra note 19, R. 1.6.
24. HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at 10, 35.
25. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that "[t]he
abortion decision differs in important ways from other decisions that may be made during minor-
ity" because of the "potentially severe detriment" that a minor faces in becoming a young mother
and because it is one of the "few situations in which denying a minor the right to make an impor-
tant decision will have consequences so grave and indelible").
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court that she is mature enough to make the decision on her own or
that it is in her best interests to have an abortion.2 6 If a guardian
ad litem advocates a result that he or she believes to be in the best
interests of the minor, but that is expressly opposite (i.e., that the
minor should involve her parents or that the minor should not ob-
tain an abortion) to the option that the minor desires, then the
guardian ad litem is effectively depriving the minor of her right to
seek the judicial bypass. By substituting his or her judgment for
that of the minor, the guardian ad litem is serving as the adjudica-
tor of the minor's interests when that role should be properly left to
the court in a judicial bypass hearing. In this situation, the guard-
ian ad litem essentially exercises the third-party veto that the Su-
preme Court expressly rejected in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth
and Bellotti v. Baird,27 and imposes an undue burden 28 on a minor's
right to seek a judicial waiver. An attorney, on the other hand, does
not have the freedom to impose such a choice on a minor since the
attorney is professionally and ethically bound to advocate for the
result that his or her client desires. As a result, appointing a guard-
ian ad litem in a judicial bypass proceeding may potentially com-
promise a minor's constitutionally protected right to seek a judicial
waiver of parental involvement, given that a guardian ad litem has
the power to contradict a minor's wishes.
This Note argues that, in states that permit the appointment
of independent counsel on behalf of a minor in judicial bypass pro-
ceedings, the appointed counsel must represent a minor as an at-
torney and not as a guardian ad litem. Part II of this Note discusses
the Supreme Court jurisprudence establishing a minor's right to
seek a waiver of parental involvement and the bypass framework,
as well as the "undue burden" standard articulated by the Supreme
Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Part III explains the rules
governing attorney-client relationships and guidelines for guardi-
ans ad litem. Part IV argues that the appointment of a guardian ad
litem in a judicial bypass hearing is an undue burden on a minor's
right to seek a judicial waiver and that the traditional role of a
26. See id. at 643-44.
27. See id. at 644 (stating that the judicial bypass process "must ensure that the provision
requiring parental consent does not in fact amount to the 'absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto'
that was found impermissible in Danforth"); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 426 U.S. 52, 74
(1976) ("[T]he State does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute,
and possibly arbitrary, veto over the [minor's] decision ... to terminate [her] pregnancy.").
28. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-77 (1992) (setting forth "undue
burden" as the appropriate standard under which a state restriction on a woman's right to ter-
minate her pregnancy should be evaluated); see also infra Part IJ.B (describing the Casey deci-
sion in greater detail).
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guardian ad litem is not appropriate for the judicial bypass context.
Part V concludes by summarizing the ethical implications of ap-
pointing a guardian ad litem rather than an attorney and the rea-
sons why appointment of a guardian ad litem constitutes an undue
burden.
II. THE ABORTION RIGHTS OF MINORS
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Roe v. Wade es-
tablished that a woman's right to an abortion is a fundamental lib-
erty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. 29 Since Roe, the Court has decided several cases concerning
the right of a minor to have an abortion. 0 The Court has acknowl-
edged the rights of parents to raise their children in a manner of
their own choosing. 31 Accordingly, the Court has recognized that
"constitutional principles [must] be applied with sensitivity and
flexibility to the special needs of parents and children,"32 and there-
fore, "the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children
justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors."3 3 The Court has
offered three reasons in support of its view: (1) "the peculiar vul-
nerability of children"; (2) "their inability to make critical decisions
in an informed, mature manner"; and (3) "the importance of the pa-
29. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("[The] right of privacy [as it is] founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action.., is broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."). The Court rea-
soned in Roe that the fundamental privacy interest as protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment extended to cover the right to choose to terminate one's pregnancy. Id.
The Court in Roe established a trimester framework: in the first trimester, the woman, in con-
sultation with her doctor, has the right to choose to terminate her pregnancy without any state
interference; in the second trimester, the state is permitted to regulate abortion in relation to
preservation and protection of the woman's health; and in the third trimester, the state is per-
mitted to prohibit abortion post-viability only if the state provided exceptions for the life and
health of the woman. Id. at 163-64.
The right to privacy in the area of procreation was first set forth in Griswold v. Connecticut,
in which the Court held that personal privacy interests-in this case, the right of married cou-
ples to use birth control for the prevention of conception-were protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they were "implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty." 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). In other words, personal privacy inter-
ests were fundamental interests that could not be infringed upon by the state. Id.
30. See infra note 38.
31. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that parents have an in-
terest in directing the upbringing of their children with respect to educational choice); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (holding that parents have the right to raise their chil-
dren as they choose, including the choice of what foreign language a child could learn in school).
32. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634.
33. Id. at 637.
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rental role in child rearing."34 The Court has thus concluded that
the state has the right to make adjustments to its legal system
when considering the rights of children.35 The Court, however, has
also recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment protects minors as
well as adults,36 and in this context, it has explicitly recognized the
right of a minor to demonstrate that she is capable of deciding on
her own whether or not to terminate her pregnancy or that an abor-
tion is in her best interests. 37 It is within this constitutional frame-
work that the Court has reviewed the abortion rights of minors.
A. The Bypass Framework: Bellotti v. Baird
The seminal Supreme Court case concerning a minor's right
to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy is Bellotti v.
Baird.38 Bellotti involved a challenge to a Massachusetts parental
34. Id. at 634.
35. Id. at 635 (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971) (plurality opin-
ion)).
36. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Constitutional rights do
not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of major-
ity. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional
rights."); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) ("[Nleither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is for adults alone.").
37. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44.
38. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). Planned Parenthood v. Danforth laid the groundwork for the Bel-
lotti decision. 428 U.S. at 52. In Danforth, the Court struck down a provision of Missouri's abor-
tion statute requiring a minor to obtain the consent of one parent before obtaining an abortion on
the basis that the State was offering a third party unilateral, and potentially arbitrary, veto
power over the decision of the minor and her physician that she have an abortion. See id. at 56-
58, 74. The Court concluded that the State did not have the constitutional authority to provide
such veto power because the State did not have a sufficient state interest in such a restriction.
See id. at 74-75. The Court reasoned that the family unit and parental authority-preservation
of which was the State's asserted interest-was not likely strengthened by allowing a parent
absolute veto power over a minor's personal decision, particularly in a situation where the exis-
tence of the minor's pregnancy itself has caused the family great distress. Id. at 75.
Since Danforth, the Court has decided several other cases regarding the constitutional valid-
ity of state parental involvement statutes. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 297 (1997)
(per curiam) (upholding a Montana parental notice statute on the basis that the language, which
required the court to grant a waiver of the notification requirement when notice-not an abor-
tion-was not in the best interests of the minor, was consistent with language upheld in the
decision of Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) ("Akron IT'));
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) (upholding a one-parent consent statute
on the basis that it complied with the judicial bypass requirements under Bellotti); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 458-61 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(concluding that a two-parent notice statute in Minnesota was constitutional on the basis that
the statute contained a judicial bypass provision that satisfied Bellotti requirements); Ohio v.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 507-08, 511-14 (1990) ("Akron I') (upholding an
Ohio statute that required a physician to give notice to one parent, or a court to approve a waiver
of parental involvement, before a minor could obtain an abortion on the basis that the judicial
bypass procedure in the statute provided the two-part test and satisfied the conditions of ano-
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consent statute'that required a minor to seek first the consent of
both parents; if the parents refused permission, the statute permit-
ted the minor to obtain consent from a judge for "good cause," pro-
vided that the parents were notified of any court proceedings.3 9 A
plurality of Justices struck down the statute on the grounds that it
was unconstitutional. 40 The plurality opinion, written by Justice
Powell, concluded that the statute impermissibly required parental
consultation in all circumstances, even once a minor sought permis-
sion from a court to obtain the abortion. 41 He also concluded that
the statute impermissibly allowed for judicial disregard of the mi-
nor's desire to have an abortion, even when the judge had found the
minor to be mature and well informed.42 He recognized that the
State had a valid interest in encouraging a minor to seek the advice
and support of her parents before undergoing an abortion. 43 Justice
Powell also recognized, however, "the unique nature of the abortion
decision," particularly for a minor, and the "potentially severe det-
riment" that she faces with an unwanted pregnancy. 44 In addition
to the limited timeframe for having an abortion,45 he recognized
that "considering her probable education, employment skills, finan-
cial resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may
be exceptionally burdensome for a minor."
46
The lasting significance of Bellotti is the Powell plurality's
mandate that a state establish a bypass provision to avoid the con-
nymity and expedition required under Bellotti); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 439-41 (1983) (invalidating an ordinance that required either the informed
written consent of one parent, or a court order allowing the abortion, before a physician could
perform an abortion on a minor less than fifteen years of age on the basis that the ordinance did
not provide adequate alternative procedures for minors seeking abortions as required under
Bellotti); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 479 & n.4, 493 (1983) (upholding a
Missouri statute that required minors to obtain the informed written consent of one parent, or a
waiver of parental consent from the court in a judicial bypass procedure, on the basis that the
statute complied with Bellotti judicial bypass requirements); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398,
407, 411 (1981) (sustaining a Utah parental consent statute on the specific facts of this case,
even though the statute did not contain a judicial bypass option, because the Court found that
parental consultation in the case of this particular immature minor would be in her best inter-
ests).
39. 443 U.S. at 625-26, 630.
40. Id. at 651.
41. See id. at 647-48.
42. Id. at 650.
43. Id. at 649.
44. Id. at 641-42.
45. In recognizing "the unique nature of the abortion decision," Justice Powell stated that a
minor could not wait long to terminate her pregnancy because the opportunity to abort "effec-
tively expires in a matter of weeks from the onset of pregnancy." Id. at 642.
46. Id.
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stitutional problem of allowing the parental involvement require-
ment to serve as a third-party veto over the minor's decision to have
an abortion.47 The plurality opinion directed that, where the alter-
native bypass procedure takes the form of a court proceeding, the
minor is entitled to the opportunity to demonstrate that: (1) she is
sufficiently mature and well informed in order to reach her decision
independently, or (2) the abortion would be in her best interests. 48
Under Bellotti, if a court finds that the minor satisfies either crite-
rion, then the court must grant the petition.49 In addition, the plu-
rality opinion in Bellotti mandated that the proceeding be com-
pleted anonymously and expeditiously to ensure that abortion re-
mains a viable option. 50
B. Undue Burden: Planned Parenthood v. Casey
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court evaluated the
constitutionality of several provisions in a Pennsylvania abortion
statute, including a parental consent requirement.5 1 The primary
significance of Casey lies in the Court's rejection of the trimester
framework established in Roe and its subsequent replacement with
an "undue burden" standard.5 2 The Court reaffirmed the core hold-
ing of Roe 53-that a woman has a right to an abortion before fetal
viability and that the state cannot proscribe abortion post-viability
without a life or health exception for the mother. The Court, how-
ever, replaced the trimester framework with an "undue burden"
standard that grants the states greater flexibility in regulating
abortion in the pre-viability time period.5 4 The Court defined a find-
ing of undue burden as "the conclusion that a state regulation has
the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of
a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." 55 Under Casey,
if an abortion restriction is found to impose an "undue burden" on
47. Id. at 643 ('[l]f the State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both par-
ents' consent to an abortion, it also must provide an alternative procedure whereby authorization
for the abortion can be obtained." (footnote omitted)).
48. Id. at 643-44.
49. Id. at 644.
50. Id.
51. 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
52. See id. at 873-76.
53. Id. at 846 ("[T]he essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again
reaffirmed.").
54. See id. at 873-77.
55. Id. at 877.
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the woman's ability to obtain an abortion, then the statute is un-
constitutional and will be struck down.
56
In sum, the Court has recognized that the state interest in
encouraging parental consultation and guidance when a minor is
deciding whether or not to have an abortion justifies different re-
strictions on abortion than those imposed on adult women. 57 In bal-
ancing the competing interests of parental involvement and a mi-
nor's desire to decide independently whether or not to have an abor-
tion, the Court has recognized the significance of such a personal
decision. 58 It has concluded that a minor has the right to demon-
strate to a court that she is capable of choosing on her own whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy or that it is in her best interests
to have an abortion.59
III. ATTORNEY VERSUS GUARDIAN AD LITEM: A COMPARISON
OF PROFESSIONAL AND ETHICAL DUTIES
Following the Supreme Court's 1967 landmark decision in In
re Gault,60 most commentators now agree that children benefit from
independent representation in any proceeding adjudicating their
personal interests. 61 The current debate among child advocates fo-
cuses on whether the individual appointed to represent the minor
56. Id.
57. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635-39 (1979) (describing state and parental inter-
ests in limiting freedom of a minor to make significant life decisions independently because of a
minor's typical lack of experience, judgment, or knowledge to perceive potentially harmful
choices and because of a parent's right to direct a child's upbringing).
58. See id. at 642-43 (noting the "unique" character of the abortion decision and the poten-
tially severe and irreversible consequences for the minor if she carries an unwanted pregnancy to
term).
59. Id. at 643-44.
60. 387 U.S. 1, 27-28, 41 (1967) (extending due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, including the right to counsel, to minors in juvenile delinquency proceedings).
61. See, e.g., Donald N. Duquette & Sarah H. Ramsey, Representation of Children in Child
Abuse and Neglect Cases: An Empirical Look at What Constitutes Effective Representation, 20 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 341, 346-47 (1987) (stating that most commentators recognize the need for
independent representation for minors in child protection proceedings); Brian G. Fraser, Inde-
pendent Representation for the Abused and Neglected Child: The Guardian ad Litem, 13 CAL. W.
L. REv. 16, 31 (1976) (arguing that "in every case of child abuse which results in a juvenile court
proceeding, . . . the child is entitled to and needs independent representation"); Linda L. Long,
When the Client Is a Child: Dilemmas in the Lawyer's Role, 21 J. FAM. L. 607, 611 (1983) (stating
that few commentators believe that legal representation of a minor should be left only to a
guardian ad litem to determine the "best interests" of the minor and accept that lawyers will be
involved); Wilber, supra note 13, at 350 (stating that modern commentators agree that children
need independent legal counsel when they are the subject of legal proceedings).
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in a civil proceeding should be a guardian ad litem or an attorney.62
If an attorney is appointed as a guardian ad litem, which is permit-
ted in some jurisdictions,6 3 scholars disagree on what role the at-
torney should play.
64
This debate exists because attorneys and guardians ad litem
appointed for minors in civil proceedings assume very different
roles in legal proceedings. Traditionally, an attorney is expected to
represent his or her client's interests zealously and "to carry out all
proper, legal, and ethical directives of the client."65 This role derives
from society's expectation that an attorney is a vehicle through
which a litigant may protect his or her individual rights.66 Unlike
the relationship a guardian ad litem has with a minor client, the
attorney-client relationship emphasizes personal autonomy and cli-
ent control.
6 7
62. Buss, supra note 21, at 1700-01 (stating that the debate is generally divided into "two
camps" between those favoring a guardian ad litem to represent the best interests of the minor
and those favoring an attorney to represent the minor's expressed interests). Compare Eitzen,
supra note 13, at 57-58 (advocating appointment of independent legal counsel on behalf of child
in custody proceedings), and Wilber, supra note 13, at 350-53, 356 (discrediting use of guardian
ad litem and arguing for appointment of separate attorney for child to advocate child's wishes),
with Fraser, supra note 61, at 33-34 (advocating guardian ad litem model of representation), and
Rebecca H. Heartz, Guardians ad Litem in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings: Clarifying the
Roles to Improve Effectiveness, 27 FAM. L.Q. 327, 341-46 (1993) (same).
63. See HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at 2-5 (reviewing a selection of state statutes governing
appointment of attorney as guardian ad litem); see also JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING
CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS § 2-3(b) (2d
ed. 2001) (reviewing state statutes that govern the role of lawyers in representing minors in child
protective proceedings).
64. See HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at 2-5 (noting confusion and lack of uniformity created
by varying state statutory guidelines regarding role of the attorney appointed in capacity as
guardian ad litem); Robert Kelly & Sarah Ramsey, Do Attorneys for Children in Protection Pro-
ceedings Make a Difference?-A Study of the Impact of Representation Under Conditions of High
Judicial Intervention, 21 J. FAM. L. 405, 411-14 (1983) (noting lack of uniformity as to attorney
responsibilities in guardian ad litem role among state statutes requiring appointment of counsel
for minors); Long, supra note 61, at 611-12 (noting confusion created by statutes mandating that
the guardian ad litem be an attorney and the conflict that this arrangement creates in profes-
sional and ethical obligations to the minor client); Shepherd & England, supra note 12, at 1933-
34 (discussing confusion and inconsistency among state statutory guidelines for guardians ad
litem and how the confusion is compounded by debate as to whether an attorney should serve as
a guardian ad litem when representing a child client).
65. HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at 12.
66. See Martin Guggenheim, The Right to Be Represented but Not Heard: Reflections on Le-
gal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 79 (1984) ("[Tlhe function of counsel in our
legal system is to enable individual litigants to enforce, protect, and preserve their own legal
rights."); Wilber, supra note 13, at 353 (stating that the attorney's function "is to enable litigants
to pursue and protect their legal rights").
67. See Guggenheim, supra note 66, at 80-82 (discussing importance of client control in at-
torney-client relationship and how client control reflects American legal system's emphasis on
individual autonomy).
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Accordingly, an attorney is bound by the American Bar Asso-
ciation's Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"), a set
of ethical and professional guidelines that are followed by most
states.68 The Model Rules operate under a paradigm of client-
centered decisionmaking so that an attorney is bound to advocate a
client's expressed wishes. 69 The most relevant Rule for a minor's
attorney is Rule 1.14, which establishes ethical guidelines for rep-
resenting clients "under a disability."70 Rule 1.14 provides that "the
lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal cli-
ent-lawyer relationship with the client" if the client is unable, due
to minority status, mental impairment, or another reason, to make
an informed judgment. 71 An attorney representing a minor client
"therefore owes the same duties of undivided loyalty, confidential-
ity, and zealous representation of the [minor's] expressed wishes as
he or she would to an adult client," and is bound to advocate the
minor's position and maintain client confidentiality.
72
While an attorney is present to give a minor an independent
voice in the proceedings, a guardian ad litem is an individual ap-
pointed to stand in the place of the minor in legal proceedings. 73 A
68. See supra note 19; see also HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at 24-25 (discussing code of eth-
ics that attorneys must follow); Shepherd & England, supra note 12, at 1934-36 (discussing at-
torney's ethical obligations); Ventrell, supra note 12, at 269-70 (stating that all states model
their ethical standards upon the Model Code of Professional Responsibility or the Model Rules).
69. MODEL RULES, supra note 19, R. 1.2(a) ("A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions con-
cerning the objectives of representation .... and shall consult with the client as to the means by
which they are to be pursued.").
70. Id. R. 1.14.
71. Id. R. 1.14(a). Model Rule 1.14 also permits the attorney to request the appointment of a
guardian ad litem for a client, but only when the attorney "reasonably believes that the client
cannot adequately act in the client's own interest." Id. R. 1.14(b). Commentators have discussed
the fact that, while the Rule attempts to provide guidance for attorneys who represent children,
it still does not provide direction for attorneys who "lack the clear guidance of the client."
PETERS, supra note 63, § 2-3(c); see also HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at 25-26 (discussing lack of
criteria in the Model Rules to help attorneys for minors determine when an "exceptional rela-
tionship" exists or what an attorney's special duties might be).
72. HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at 12. As commentators generally suggest, this obligation
on the part of an attorney may vary if the minor client is "not capable of understanding the mat-
ter or contributing to the advancement of his or her interests." See id. at 12-13 (recognizing that
the traditional role of the attorney in representing a minor may be modified depending upon the
minor client's maturity level); see also Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role
of Counsel for Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1420 (1996) (noting that attorneys should not
permit their clients complete control when they do not have autonomy rights, such as in the case
of young children).
73. HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at 5 (defining a guardian ad litem as one "who in a liti-
gated matter stands in the place of a party deemed legally incompetent"); Wilber, supra note 13,
at 356 ("Traditionally, a guardian ad litem is appointed to make decisions for the client when the
client is under a legal disability."). One commentator has expressed the view that the role of the
guardian ad litem is in fact to stand in place of the parents, not of the child, because it is the
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guardian ad litem is distinguished from a minor's legal guardian
because a guardian ad litem's status as advocate for a minor exists
only for that particular litigation.7 4 At common law, a guardian ad
litem was appointed by the court to advocate the best interests of a
minor in a particular situation based on the government's authority
to intervene under the doctrine of parens patriae. 75 Today, the role
of a guardian ad litem is to protect a minor's welfare and to make
decisions on behalf of the minor on the basis of what the guardian
ad litem deems to be in the best interests of the minor.76 A guardian
ad litem is not bound by a minor's expressed preferences because a
minor may not have "the cognitive ability or maturity of judgment
inability of the parents to look out for their child's best interests that causes the state to inter-
vene and appoint a guardian ad litem. Stuckey, supra note 15, at 1795.
74. HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at 5 (distinguishing the role of a minor's legal guardian,
who serves essentially as a parent, from that of a guardian ad litem, who only retains authority
over the minor's interests for that specific legal matter); 1 KRAMER, supra note 15, § 12.05, at 542
("The guardian ad litem's authority normally ceases at the conclusion of the litigation or upon
entry of judgment ...."); Ventrell, supra note 12, at 268-69 (stating that a guardian ad litem's
status exists only for the particular litigation in which he or she is representing the minor).
75. See Long, supra note 61, at 612 (stating that a guardian ad litem at common law had
the duty to determine what actions would be in the best interest of the minor and to advocate for
that position); Stuckey, supra note 15, at 1794-95 (explaining that the state claimed authority to
intervene in the life of the minor through a guardian ad litem because the state had the duty to
protect the minor's welfare under the doctrine of parens patriae).
Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the state is considered the guardian of society's values
and thus of minors when parents abuse their rights of care and control over their children. Fra-
ser, supra note 61, at 26; see also Ventrell, supra note 12, at 262-64 (offering historical overview
of state's parens patriae role); Lyon, supra note 12, at 683-84 (noting state's duty to protect chil-
dren's safety and well-being).
76. HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at 6 (stating that the guardian ad litem "makes decisions
in the case based on [his or her] view of what is in the best interests of the child client" and "need
not be bound procedurally or substantively by the child's expressed desires"); Fraser, supra note
61, at 33; Stuckey, supra note 15, at 1787-88 (explaining that the guardian ad litem determines a
minor's options based upon what he or she believes to be in the minor's best interests); see, e.g.,
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4005(1)(B) (West 1992 & Supp. 2001) ("The guardian ad litem
shall act in pursuit of the best interests of the child."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-601A (1999) (requir-
ing guardian ad litem "to protect and promote the best interests of the juvenile"); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6311(b) (West Supp. 2001) ("The guardian ad litem shall be charged with represen-
tation of the . . .best interests of the child ...."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-124(A) (West Supp.
2000) ("The guardian ad litem is charged in general with the duty of representation of the child's
best interests."); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.235(3)(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2001) ("The guardian ad
litem shall be an advocate for the best interests of the [minor] ...."). In describing the role of the
guardian ad litem, Fraser stated that the guardian ad litem assumes four functions: that of an
investigator who "ferret[s] out all of the relevant facts" in a situation, that of an advocate who
ensures that the court reviews all of the facts, that of a counsel who ensures that the court is
aware of all of the child's possible options, and that of a guardian who ensures that "the child's
interests are fully protected." Fraser, supra note 61, at 33-34.
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to make wise choices or to appreciate the consequences of deci-
sions."77
States have enacted various models for the appointment of
guardians ad litem.78 Depending upon the state, a guardian ad
litem can either be an attorney, a lay volunteer, 79 or, in some juris-
77. HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at 6; 1 KRAMER, supra note 15, § 12.05, at 542-43 (stating
that, in some jurisdictions, a minor's wishes are not controlling when they conflict with a minor's
best interests); PETERS, supra note 63, § 2-3(b), at 37 ("[C]hose attention to the statements and
wishes of the child runs a distant third behind the[ ] more primary duties of the guardian ad
litem assessment of best interests and [the guardian's duties] to the Court."); see, e.g., WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 48.235(3)(a) ("The guardian ad litem ... shall consider, but shall not be bound by, the
wishes of [the minor] or the positions of others as to the best interests of [the minor]." (emphasis
added)); Colorado Guardian ad Litem Mission Statement, reprinted in ANN M. HARALAMBIE, THE
CHILD'S ATTORNEY app. B at 245 (1993) ("The [guardian ad litem] does not necessarily adopt or
advocate for the child's desires unless it would serve the child's best interests." (emphasis
added)); New Hampshire Guidelines for Guardians ad Litem, reprinted in ANN M. HARALAMBIE,
THE CHILD'S ATTORNEY app. B at 248 (1993) ("The Guardian ad Litem should consider the pref-
erences of the minor(s) but the preferences shall not be binding upon the Guardian ad Litem nor
should they create a presumption as to any issue." (emphasis added)). In some jurisdictions, how-
ever, a guardian ad litem may take the minor's preferences into consideration and inform the
court of those wishes, if they differ from what the guardian ad litem is advocating. HARALAMBIE,
supra note 21, at 6; 1 KRAMER, supra note 15, § 12.05, at 543; see, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §
587-34(c) (Lexis 1999) ("A guardian ad litem shall inform the court of the [minor's] perceived
interests if they differ from those being advocated by the [minor's] guardian ad litem."); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 48.235(3)(a) ("If the guardian ad litem determines that the best interests of the
[minor] are substantially inconsistent with the wishes of [the minor], the guardian ad litem shall
so inform the court ... ").
78. Heartz, supra note 62, at 332; see also PETERS, supra note 63, § 2-3(b), at 38 n.10 ("The
statutory language alone [in state laws governing the appointment of guardians ad litem in child
protective proceedings] demonstrates that different states believe that the essence of the guard-
ian ad litem role varies widely."). The following discussion of guardian ad litem appointments is
largely specific to child abuse and neglect proceedings because guardian ad litem appointments
are most consistent in the area of child protective proceedings as a result of the 1974 passage of
the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act ("CAPTA"), which required states to
appoint a guardian ad litem for minors in child protective proceedings in exchange for federal aid
to fund abuse prevention programs. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No.
93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107 (1994)); 1 KRAMER, supra note 15, §
12.02, at 532 (noting that "appointment of guardians in child abuse and neglect cases is wide-
spread" due to the passage of CAPTA); Shepherd & England, supra note 12, at 1922 (reviewing
varying levels of independent representation for minors in proceedings outside the child abuse
and neglect context).
79. Lay volunteers are typically court-appointed special advocates ("CASA'). PETERS, supra
note 63, § 2-3(b), at 35 n.6 (discussing genesis of CASA movement); Heartz, supra note 62, at
336-37 (discussing inception and use of CASA program); see also Laurie K. Adams, CASA- A
Child's Voice in Court, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1467, 1467-72 (1996) (providing background on
national CASA program and on program as conceived in one Nebraska county); Duquette &
Ramsey, supra note 61, at 348-49 (discussing inception and use of CASA program). A CASA
volunteer can be paired with an attorney, act as an independent advocate for the minor, or act as
an assistant to the caseworkers. Duquette & Ramsey, supra note 61, at 349. Similar to those in
other capacities who serve as guardians ad litem, most CASA volunteers serve as investigators of
their clients' cases. Heartz, supra note 62, at 338. They provide written reports to the court with
recommendations on the case and are usually required to appear at all hearings and to monitor
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dictions, a social worker, probation officer, or court counselor.80
While specific guidelines for guardians ad litem vary by state, indi-
viduals serving as guardians ad litem are generally expected to
conduct an independent investigation of their clients' cases.81
Guardians ad litem may be permitted to subpoena client records
and witnesses, 8 2 may present evidence to the court, including exam-
ining and cross-examining witnesses,8 3 and may also offer testi-
mony to the court.8 4 A guardian ad litem may also be expected to
the court's orders until the case is dismissed after final resolution. Id. Some jurisdictions also
permit CASA volunteers to cross-examine witnesses and file petitions in legal proceedings
through their own attorneys. See, e.g., Adams, supra, at 1469 (noting that CASA volunteers can
cross-examine witnesses through their attorneys); H. Lila Hubert, In the Child's Best Interests:
The Role of the Guardian ad Litem in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, 49 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 531, 562-63 (1994) (stating that guardians ad litem, who are CASA volunteers in Florida,
often file petitions in termination of parental rights proceedings through their attorneys).
80. Heartz, supra note 62, at 332.
81. HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at 8 ("The central feature of all of the guidelines for
guardians ad litem is that [he or she] must make a thorough investigation of the case."); see, e.g.,
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317(e) (West 1998 & Supp. 2002) ("[Cjounsel [for the minor] shall
make or cause to have made any further investigations that he or she deems in good faith to be
reasonably necessary to ascertain the facts .. "); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 587-34(c) (Lexis 1999)
(permitting guardian ad litem to make independent investigation of minor's situation); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4005(1)(B) (requiring guardian ad litem to conduct independent investiga-
tion); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-601(a) (1999) ("The duties of the guardian ad litem ... shall be to
make an investigation to determine the facts, the needs of the juvenile, and the available re-
sources within the family and community to meet those needs .. "); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
6311(b) (requiring guardian ad litem to conduct independent investigation); S.C. CODE ANN. §
20-7-122(3) (West Supp. 2000) (same); Colorado Guardian ad Litem Mission Statement, supra
note 77, at 243-44 (requiring guardian ad litem to "conduct a thorough and independent investi-
gation").
82. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 587-34(b)(2) (authorizing guardian ad litem "to inspect
and receive copies of' any relevant client documents); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-6-6 (Michie 1997)
(permitting guardian ad litem to subpoena witnesses in domestic relations proceedings); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4005(1)(B) (granting guardian ad litem "access to all reports and re-
cords relevant to the [minor's] case"), 4005(1)(C) (permitting guardian ad litem to subpoena wit-
nesses); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6311(b)(2) (granting guardian ad litem access to all reports
and documents concerning the minor client); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-125 (West Supp. 2000)
(same).
83. 1 KRAMER, supra note 15, § 12.05, at 544 ("The guardian may present evidence and wit-
nesses, and may cross-examine witnesses at all evidentiary hearings .. "); see, e.g., CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 317(e) ("[Counsel for the minor] shall examine and cross-examine witnesses
in... hearings... [and] may also introduce and examine his or her own witnesses .... "); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-17-6-6 (permitting guardian ad litem to present evidence to the court in domes-
tic relations proceedings); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4005(1)(C) (authorizing guardian ad
litem to "examine and cross-examine witnesses"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-272.01(2)(e) (1998) (au-
thorizing guardian ad litem to "present evidence and witnesses and [to] cross-examine witnesses
at all evidentiary hearings"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6311(b)(5) (permitting guardian ad litem
to "examine and cross-examine witnesses"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-124(C) (West Supp. 2000)
("The guardian ad litem is authorized through counsel to introduce, examine, and cross-examine
witnesses in any proceeding involving the [minor] .... ).
84. See HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at 10-11; Heartz, supra note 62, at 336; see, e.g., Mo.
REV. STAT. § 452.423(2)(1) (2000) (permitting guardian ad litem to offer testimony to court);
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make recommendations to the court regarding a client's case.8 5 Be-
cause a guardian ad litem is generally expected to conduct an inde-
pendent assessment of a minor's situation, and take a position to
the court as to the disposition of the minor's case, the guardian is
effectively allowed to substitute his or her judgment for that of the
minor.8 6 Accordingly, a guardian ad litem is generally not ethically
bound, as is an attorney, to maintain a minor client's confidential-
ity because a guardian's independent investigative duties permit a
guardian to discuss a minor's situation with third parties and be-
cause, in making a recommendation to the court, a guardian may be
permitted to reveal client confidences.8 7 Despite varying state
guidelines concerning precise client responsibilities, as a general
rule, guardians ad litem are expected to abide by the "best inter-
ests" standard and advocate for the minor's best interests, as per-
ceived by the guardian ad litem.88
Colorado Guardian ad Litem Mission Statement, supra note 77, at 245-46 (permitting guardian
ad litem to present evidence through his or her own testimony in the case).
85. HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at 10; see, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317(e) (permit-
ting guardian ad litem to "make recommendations to the court concerning the [minor's] wel-
fare"); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 587-34(c) ("A guardian ad litem . . . shall report to the
court... regarding such guardian ad litem's activities on behalf of the [minor] and recommenda-
tions concerning the manner in which the court should proceed in the best interests of the [mi-
nor] .... "); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4005(1)(C) (requiring guardian ad litem to "make a
recommendation to the court"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-272.01(2)(f) (requiring guardian ad litem to
"be responsible for making recommendations to the court regarding the temporary and perma-
nent placement of the protected juvenile"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6311(b)(7) (requiring
guardian ad litem to "[m]ake specific recommendations to the court"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-
122(5) (requiring guardian ad litem to "provide the family court with a written report .... which
includes without limitation evaluation and assessment of the issues brought before the court and
recommendations for the case plan, the wishes of the child, if appropriate, and subsequent dispo-
sition of the case"); Colorado Guardian ad Litem Mission Statement, supra note 77, at 245-46;
New Hampshire Guidelines for Guardians ad Litem, supra note 77, at 249.
86. HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at 6.
87. See id. at 10, 35; Heartz, supra note 62, at 336; see, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §
4005(1)(B)(5) (requiring guardian ad litem to interview, where possible and appropriate, third
parties (e.g., parents, teachers, case workers) as part of independent investigation); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6311(b)(5) (requiring guardian ad litem to interview witnesses); S.C. CODE ANN. §
20-7-124(B)(3) (authorizing guardian ad litem to "interview persons involved in the case"). But
see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-a(II) (Supp. 2001) ("Guardians ad litem shall respect commu-
nications between themselves and the child and shall disclose such information only in accor-
dance with applicable rules and, as required by the court, in rendering a report with the guard-
ian ad litem's recommendations .... ).
88. HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at 6, 29; see also supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text
(discussing "best interests" standard).
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IV. ANALYSIS: WHY APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN AD LITEM
ON BEHALF OF A MINOR IN THE ABORTION CONTEXT IS
PROBLEMATIC
A. Appointment of a Guardian ad Litem Constitutes an Undue
Burden
Since a guardian ad litem is generally neither ethically
bound to advocate a minor's expressed preferences nor obligated to
preserve a minor's confidentiality,8 9 appointment of a guardian ad
litem may pose a threat to and place an obstacle in the path of a
minor seeking to exercise her right under Bellotti v. Baird90 to ob-
tain a waiver of parental involvement. Such interference imposes
an undue burden on a minor's exercise of that right under Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.91
1. No Ethical Duty to Advocate a Minor's Expressed Wishes
In a judicial bypass proceeding, if a guardian ad litem elects
to substitute his or her judgment for that of a minor because he or
she differs in view as to a minor's decision, a guardian ad litem is
subverting a minor's desire to obtain an abortion without parental
involvement. For instance, a guardian ad litem might advocate that
a minor obtain parental consent or carry her pregnancy to term be-
cause the guardian ad litem has a different view regarding the mi-
nor's level of maturity or emotional development or, in a more ex-
treme case, opposes abortion on ideological grounds. By recom-
mending a different outcome than the minor desires to the court
and by substituting his or her judgment for that of the minor, the
guardian ad litem is hindering the minor's ability to exercise her
constitutionally protected right to petition a court for a waiver of
parental involvement. 92 As such, the guardian ad litem is directly
interfering with the minor's decision to seek a waiver of parental
involvement, and thus, her decision to make the choice on her own.
89. See supra notes 76-77, 86-87 and accompanying text.
90. 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (holding that a pregnant minor is entitled to appear before a
judge to show either that she is sufficiently mature or that it is in her best interests to obtain an
abortion without parental involvement).
91. The Court first established the "undue burden" standard in Casey when it replaced the
trimester framework under Roe, under which a regulation restricting abortion would be invali-
dated if the court determined that the regulation placed "a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." 505 U.S. 833, 876-77 (1992); see supra Part
II.B.
92. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44.
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In this situation, the guardian ad litem's personal convictions on
the highly charged topic of abortion would be permitted to influence
the outcome that he or she advocates to the court because the "best
interests" standard permits the guardian ad litem to inject personal
opinion into his or her arguments to the court. 93 In this way, the
opinion of the guardian ad litem could potentially serve as an arbi-
trary third-party veto-precisely the result that the Supreme Court
found impermissible in Danforth and Bellotti.94 By exercising a po-
tentially arbitrary third-party veto, the guardian ad litem places a
substantial obstacle in the path of the minor that hinders her from
seeking an abortion and is sufficient to constitute an undue burden
under Casey.
95
By contrast, representation of a minor by an attorney would
not have the same effect on a minor's choice to seek a waiver of pa-
rental involvement. An attorney appointed to represent a minor is
ethically and professionally bound to advocate the expressed wishes
of a minor client 96 and must act as a minor's independent voice in
the process. 97 Accordingly, unlike a guardian ad litem, an attorney
is prohibited by the Model Rules from expressing personal opinions
to the court as to his or her client's case 98 and from testifying as a
witness in his or her client's case. 99 A minor, therefore, would be
free to exercise her right as she sees fit, provided that the judge
rules that she is mature or that an abortion would be in her best
interests. If, however, there is no one acting in the role of zealous
advocate on behalf of the minor, then the minor's voice most likely
will not be adequately heard. By having an attorney who is ethi-
cally bound to represent the minor's interests at the judicial bypass
93. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
94. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 644 (reiterating the Danforth holding, which disallowed parental
consent provision to serve as unilateral third-party veto over minor's decision); Planned Parent-
hood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (holding that "the State does not have the constitutional
authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" over a minor's decision
to have an abortion).
95. See 505 U.S. at 877 ("A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion
that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.").
96. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
97. HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at 12 (stating that "if the child's attorney does not advocate
the child's position as the child sees it, the child really has no independent voice").
98. MODEL RULES, supra note 19, R. 3.4(e); HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at 10.
99. MODEL RULES, supra note 19, R. 3.7(a); HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at 10. Rule 3.7 pro-
vides a few exceptions to the prohibition against serving as a witness: when "testimony relates to
an uncontested issue," when testimony relates to legal services and fees, and when "disqualifica-
tion of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client." MODEL RULES, supra note 19,
R. 3.7(a)(1)-(3). None of these exceptions, however, applies in the judicial bypass context.
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hearing, a minor is assured that her position will be heard by the
judge and assured of an ally who will seek to protect her interests.
2. No Ethical Duty to Preserve a Minor's Confidentiality
In addition, since a guardian ad litem is expected to conduct
an independent investigation of a minor's case and report those
findings to the court, a guardian ad litem is generally not bound by
any ethical obligations to maintain a minor's confidentiality. 100 The
lack of confidentiality in the relationship between a guardian ad
litem and a minor could prove to be troublesome in the context of a
judicial bypass proceeding.
Bellotti requires the proceeding to be completed anony-
mously.101 If a guardian ad litem is not obligated to preserve a mi-
nor's confidentiality, then a guardian ad litem would not be obli-
gated to maintain in confidence any sensitive information relayed
by a minor during the representation. This could be problematic in
a situation, for instance, in a small community, where a guardian
ad litem personally knows the parents of a minor and may feel
morally obligated to inform the parents of their daughter's actions.
Such a breach of confidence by a guardian ad litem would violate
the requirement of confidentiality under Bellotti'10 2 and subject a
minor to the involvement of her parents in her decision-the precise
result that the minor wished to avoid. By breaching a minor's confi-
dence, a guardian ad litem permits a third party, such as a minor's
parents, to interfere with a minor's choice to seek a waiver to decide
on her own, particularly if the disclosure is made prior to the by-
pass hearing. This breach of confidence places a potentially sub-
stantial obstacle in the way of a minor and imposes an undue bur-
den under Casey on her choice not to involve her parents.
An attorney, however, is obligated under the Model Rules to
maintain client confidentiality, and is therefore prohibited from
making any kind of disclosure regarding the proceeding or the rep-
resentation to a third party. 03 In this way, a minor's confidentiality
is preserved, and the Bellotti requirement of confidentiality in the
100. HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at 10.
101. 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979) (requiring that a judicial bypass proceeding "be completed with
anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be
obtained").
102. Id.
103. MODEL RULES, supra note 19, R. 1.6. The Model Rules, however, do not unconditionally
prohibit an attorney from making disclosures to third parties, and permit an attorney discretion
in disclosing client information in situations where the attorney reasonably believes that the
client will cause injury to herself or others. See id. R. 1.6(b)(1) & cmt. 13.
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judicial bypass proceeding is satisfied. A minor is thus protected
from potential unwanted intervention by a third party attempting
to prevent her from seeking a waiver to make the decision on her
own, as she is constitutionally entitled to do.
B. The Traditional Role of a Guardian ad Litem Is Not Suited to
Representation in the Judicial Bypass Context
A guardian ad litem is traditionally appointed to represent
the independent interests of a child in a proceeding in which the
state is intervening to protect a child's welfare under the doctrine of
parens patriae. 10 4 Traditionally, a guardian ad litem represents the
interests of a child in situations where a young child lacks the ma-
turity to reason through the consequences of a significant life deci-
sion or the verbal skills to articulate his or her desires ade-
quately. 10 5 As a child grows older, the law accords a minor certain
privileges.1 06 Likewise, commentators suggest that a minor has the
cognitive ability at an older age, particularly as a teenager, to as-
sess independently the consequences of a significant life decision, to
articulate her own desires when making life decisions, and to make
choices among available alternatives. 10 7 As a result, while an older
104. Fraser, supra note 61, at 26-27, 29; Stuckey, supra note 15, at 1794.
105. See HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at 9 ("The purest example of appointment as a child's
guardian ad litem occurs when the attorney is appointed to represent an infant who is cogni-
tively and linguistically incapable of providing express direction to the attorney.... As a general
rule of thumb, the younger the child, the more likely that the court's appointment of the attorney
was intended to be in the role of guardian ad litem.").
106. For instance, many jurisdictions permit minors after a certain age (often the age of four-
teen or sixteen) to obtain many types of outside employment without parental authorization. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 25-8-33, 25-8-48 (2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 505-507 (1995); IDAHO
CODE §§ 44-1301, -1302, -1304 (1997); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 3-209, -211, -213 (1999);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, §§ 60-62 (West 1996 & Supp. 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181A.04
(West Supp. 2002).
107. Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents'Psychological
and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 129, 144-45, 147-48 (1992)
(concluding that, in study of females aged thirteen to twenty-one to examine competence to con-
sent to abortion, minors aged sixteen to seventeen did not differ from adult women aged eighteen
to twenty-one in legal competence to consent to abortion); Catherine C. Lewis, Minors' Compe-
tence to Consent to Abortion, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 84, 86-87 (1987) (suggesting that older mi-
nors and adults are equally competent to reason through decisions regarding pregnancy and
contraception); Gary B. Melton & Anita J. Pliner, Adolescent Abortion: A Psycholegal Analysis, in
ADOLESCENT ABORTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 1, 18-19 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1986)
(suggesting that "there is no reason to believe that adolescents will be less competent than adult
women in decision making about abortion"); Anita J. Pliner & Suzanne Yates, Psychological and
Legal Issues in Minors'Rights to Abortion, 48 J. SOC. ISSUES 203, 205 (1992) (stating that studies
regarding the competence of minors to give informed consent to medical treatment generally
have concluded that older minors are able to make these judgments independently in a similar
manner to adults).
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minor may still need independent representation, she does not need
the assistance of a guardian ad litem because she is capable of de-
termining her best interests independently. 108
In addition to the fact that a minor seeking a judicial waiver
is likely to be older, the circumstances surrounding a minor's un-
wanted pregnancy are particularly unique and unsuited to a guard-
ian ad litem appointment when the guardian ad litem may substi-
tute his or her judgment for that of the minor. The Supreme Court
recognized in Bellotti that "[t]he abortion decision differs in impor-
tant ways from other decisions that may be made during minor-
ity."'10 9 The Court observed that the time frame for having an abor-
tion is circumscribed 1 0 and that a pregnant minor faces a "poten-
tially severe detriment" in carrying an unwanted pregnancy to
term."' Given a minor's probable lack of "education, employment
skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity," the Court con-
cluded that "there are few situations in which denying a minor the
right to make an important decision will have consequences so
grave and indelible." 112 Therefore, unlike other situations facing a
minor in which the independent judgment of a guardian ad litem
might be appropriate, appointment of a guardian ad litem in a judi-
cial bypass hearing is improper. If a guardian ad litem chooses to
substitute his or her own judgment when the guardian opposes a
minor's choice, the guardian is interfering with the minor's right to
seek a judicial waiver in a way that denies the minor "an effective
opportunity" to obtain an abortion as required under Bellotti."3 By
denying the minor the right to make an important personal deci-
sion, the guardian is imposing upon the minor the potentially se-
vere consequences the Court recognized in Bellotti.114
Furthermore, when the Supreme Court required in Bellotti
that the state provide a pregnant minor with the opportunity to
seek a judicial waiver of parental consent, 115 the Court envisioned a
judicial proceeding in which a minor would be able to offer evidence
to prove her maturity or show that an abortion is in her best inter-
ests. 1 6 In establishing such a proceeding, the Court did not envi-
108. See supra note 107.
109. 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979).
110. Id. ("A pregnant adolescent, however, cannot preserve for long the possibility of abort-
ing, which effectively expires in a matter of weeks from the onset of pregnancy.").
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 644.
114. Id. at 642.
115. Id. at 643-44.
116. Id. at 643-44, 643 n.22, 647-48.
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sion a process in which a minor's desire to decide whether to termi-
nate her pregnancy without parental involvement could be coun-
termanded by her representative at the hearing. 117 Indeed, permit-
ting a minor's representative to take a contrary position and thus
effectively remove a minor's voice from the hearing would vitiate
the entire purpose of the bypass proceeding, and would contradict
the Court's holdings in Bellotti and Danforth that "an absolute, and
possibly arbitrary," third-party veto over a minor's decision to have
an abortion is constitutionally impermissible."18
Under the Court's requirement that a state establish a judi-
cial bypass mechanism, it is the juvenile judge before whom a minor
appears, and not a minor's representative, who is authorized to de-
cide whether or not a minor is capable of making the decision on
her own, or whether it is in her best interests to have an abor-
tion. 119 In addition, the purpose of a judicial bypass hearing is to
offer a minor the opportunity to convince a court, not her represen-
tative, of her maturity or best interests to have an abortion without
parental involvement. 120 If a minor's representative asserts a con-
trary position, that opportunity is taken away from the minor be-
cause she will effectively not have a voice in the outcome of the pro-
ceeding. Moreover, in asserting a contrary position and electing to
substitute his or her judgment for that of the minor, the guardian
ad litem is serving as the adjudicator of the minor's interests when
that role should be properly left in the judicial bypass context to the
juvenile judge hearing the minor's petition. 121
V. CONCLUSION
Attorneys and guardians ad litem have very different ethical
and professional standards that govern their relationships with
their clients. The ethical guidelines to which an attorney is bound
117. See id. at 644 (holding that the judicial bypass "procedure must ensure that the provi-
sion requiring parental consent does not in fact amount to the 'absolute, and possibly arbitrary,
veto' that was found impermissible in Danforth").
118. See id. at 643 (concluding that "the unique nature and consequences of the abortion de-
cision make it inappropriate 'to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto'" over
the minor's decision to terminate her pregnancy) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 74 (1976)); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (holding that a state
does not have the constitutional power to authorize "an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto"
over the minor's decision to have an abortion).
119. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643 & n.22.
120. See id. at 643-44 & 643 n.22.
121. See id.; HARALAMBIE, supra note 21, at 6 ("Legitimate questions have been raised ...
about whether the guardian ad litem is in reality a pretrial judge.").
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provide superior protection for a minor's interests in a judicial by-
pass hearing. By contrast, a guardian ad litem is not bound to the
same standards of zealous representation to which an attorney is
bound. A guardian is therefore permitted to substitute his or her
judgment for that of a minor and is not ethically bound to maintain
a minor client's confidentiality. 122 Permitting representation of a
minor by a guardian ad litem in a judicial bypass proceeding invites
the possibility that a minor's desire to obtain an abortion could be
subverted by a guardian ad litem who advocates that a minor
should consult with her parents, or that an abortion is not in her
best interests. In such a situation, the state is imposing an undue
burden under Casey on a minor seeking a judicial bypass. First, a
guardian ad litem is effectively exercising the third-party veto
found unconstitutional in Danforth and Bellotti.123 Second, a guard-
ian ad litem is permitted to breach a minor's confidence, in viola-
tion of the requirement under Bellotti that judicial bypass proceed-
ings be conducted in a confidential manner. 124 In Bellotti, the Su-
preme Court did not envision a judicial bypass process in which a
minor's representative could object to the very purpose for which
the minor comes before the court. Accordingly, the guardian ad
litem model of representation, as it is traditionally applied, is not
appropriate within the judicial bypass framework as originally es-
tablished by the Court, and thus, should be not used in the bypass
context. 12
5
In a situation where a minor's decision to terminate her
pregnancy is at stake, a minor should not have her right to seek a
judicial waiver left to the discretion of a representative who is per-
mitted to assess a pregnant minor's options in light of his or her
own personal beliefs or wishes. This situation does not permit a
meaningful exercise of a minor's rights and does not allow for "an
effective opportunity" to obtain an abortion as mandated under Bel-
lotti.126 As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, minors and adults
alike are protected under the Constitution, 127 and states are not
permitted to interfere with a minor's right to seek permission
through the courts to make the abortion decision on her own when
she chooses not to involve her parents.' 28 By offering a minor's rep-
122. See supra notes 73-88 and accompanying text.
123. See supra Part IV.A.1.
124. See supra Part IV.A.2.
125. See supra Part IV.B.
126. 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979).
127. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
128. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44.
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resentative the opportunity to countermand a minor's desire to ex-
ercise her right, the state is effectively allowing a third party dis-
cretion over her decision, a circumstance that the Supreme Court
has specifically prohibited in its jurisprudence concerning a minor's
right to choose.
When the state allows a guardian ad litem to represent a
minor in a judicial bypass proceeding, the state faces serious consti-
tutional problems on the part of a minor. If the state grants a right
to counsel for a minor in a judicial bypass proceeding, the state
should provide her with the assistance of an attorney only, not a
guardian ad litem. States that permit appointment of a guardian ad
litem in a judicial bypass hearing should therefore change the
counsel provisions in their parental involvement statutes and per-
mit only an attorney to represent a minor.
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